The
Nature of the Moists Attack !!
Maoist
attacks on the security forces and the symbols of state power are characterised
by
- meticulous
planning,
- systematic
preparation,
- near-surgical
execution and
- a
high degree of coordination.
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On
several occasions, the rebels have achieved considerable success in launching
synchronised attacks on multiple targets involving large numbers of cadres. For
the Maoists, besides waging a protracted people’s war with the ultimate
objective of capturing or seizing political power, participating in a peace
process and talks is a ‘tactic’ and considered ‘war by other means’.
Response
of the State !!
The
response of various state governments and the Centre is invariably reactive.
While the Maoists have been expanding to newer areas and have been steadily
enhancing their military capabilities, counter-Naxal operations have mostly
been lackadaisical.
The
reasons for this apathetic approach are three-fold.
1. Firstly, Naxal terrorism is not an
emotive issue at the national level like the insurgency in Jammu and
Kashmir.
2. Secondly, there is some confusion about
whether the Naxalites are terrorists or not as they have a ‘social justice’ tag
attached to them.
3. And, lastly, an impression has gained
currency that the Naxal menace is not “as bad as the media makes it out to be.”
Coordination
between the police and intelligence agencies of various affected states has
been generally
- unsatisfactory.
- acquisition,
- compilation,
- collation,
- analysis,
- synthesis
and
- dissemination
of intelligence are
- inadequate.
The
Naxalites are continuing to spread their tentacles and it is crucial that
intelligence about their activities, arms and equipment, training, sources of
funding and future operations is shared on a daily basis so that it trickles
down in near real-time to the functional level. A national-level data base of
all terrorist groups and individuals is an inescapable operational necessity.
State
police forces and the Central armed police forces (CAPFs) need to be better
equipped and trained like the army to successfully combat the serious threat
posed by the Naxalites.
- At
present they lack the army’s organisational structure and cohesiveness,
the army’s institutionalised operational experience and ethos and its
outstanding junior leadership – qualities that are mandatory for success
in counter-insurgency operations.
- A great deal more needs to be done if the states are to effectively coordinate anti-Maoist operations across their borders.
The
Maoist threat presents a clear and present danger. So far the national response
has been inadequate, both at the policy formulation and execution levels. To
cope with this serious threat, India needs a well-deliberated and finely
calibrated strategy with matching operational doctrines and the allotment of
necessary resources. Only a skilfully planned and coordinated strategy, with
all stakeholders pooling in their resources to achieve synergy in execution,
will achieve the desired results.
At the
same time, a comprehensive socio-economic strategy must be evolved to treat the
root causes of this malaise that is gnawing away at the nation’s innards, along
with a carefully drawn up plan for perception management. Good governance,
development, security and perception management must go hand in hand.
